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VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PHARMACEUTICALS:




Whether in the World Trade Organization or through local courts, the
pharmaceutical industry's fighting against compulsory licensing is not working.
The potential benefits for countries issuing and enforcing compulsory licenses far
outweigh the potential risks for these countries. Though a number of strategies to
mitigate the threat or potential damage of compulsory licensing have been
explored by various pharmaceutical companies, perhaps the most successful
strategy is the "voluntary licensing" model, most famously employed by Gilead
Pharmaceuticals in India. By preemptively and voluntarily licensing brand name
drugs, the licensor is better able to control the terms of the licensing agreement,
* Juris Doctor Candidate (2017), American University Washington College of Law.
Legal Intern at Unified Patents. Dean's Merit Scholarship recipient; member of the
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and the scope of the market for which the licensees' products can reach, while
creating additional, low risk sources of revenue. Perhaps most importantly, the
voluntary licensing model promotes cooperation between native generic
manufactures and international parties wishing to protect their intellectual
property rights, while promoting goodwill through better access to medicine, a
hot-button issue recently of great concern to governments, citizens, and media. To
ignore voluntary licensing as a strategy against compulsory licensing is to ignore
one's responsibility as legal counsel to a company concerned about intellectual
property rights subject to compulsory licenses.
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INTRODUCTION
The media often depicts the pharmaceutical industry as villainous rogues
profiting from disease.' It is a simple picture; an easily digested story which fails
to accurately highlight the importance of the industry. It does not seem to matter
whether the story involves inaccessible drugs, increases in healthcare costs,
imagined links to autism, or more real and lethal mistakes. Too many forget that
innovations in pharmaceuticals and healthcare have saved "more lives than war
[has] spent. "2
Unfortunately, innovation in pharmaceuticals is slow. Biology and chemistry
are complex sciences. Seemingly simple changes to pharmaceutical chemicals can
have wildly unpredictable results upon the human body. It took forty-two years to
discover a new colon cancer drug treatment after the initial Food and Drug
Association's approval of fluorouracil.3 Antibiotics become obsolete almost as
1 See e.g. Carolyn Y. Johnson, The Drug Industry Wants Us to Think Martin Shkreli
is a Rogue CEO. He Isn't, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2015),
https ://www. washiingtoiipost. comlnews/wolik/wp/20 15/09/25/the -drug~-industry-
wants-us-to-think-martin-shkreli-is-a-rogue-ceo-he-isnt/; Diane Ramirez, Mylan: The
Pharmaceutical Industry's Latest "Villain", DUN & BRADSTREET (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://bizmology.hoovers~conV201 6/08/pS 1817/.
2 Cf e.g., Dr. Alexander Fleming, TIME MAG., May 15, 1944 ("penicillin will save
more lives than war can spend").
3 Cancer Progress: Colorectal Cancer, AMER. SOC'Y OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY
(2015), http://www.cancerproress.net/tineline/colorectal (last visited Nov. 2, 2016)
(illustrating the time between developments in cancer research).
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quickly as they are developed. Vaccines have to fight against evolving viruses,
and there are millions of cancer patients still awaiting effective treatments. The
price of innovation is expensive, too expensive for too many people. Thus, the
high price of drugs raises serious concerns about availability. Too many people
and too many countries cannot afford brand name drugs at brand name prices;
some of these countries have resorted to compulsory licensing4 to fix this
problem.
Though those most against the compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical
patents may call it government sanctioned stealing5 , most people would agree that
the government's first priority is towards the protection and well-being of its
people.6 In regards to the pharmaceutical industry, this could mean the
government should sacrifice the potential profits of the industry over concerns
related to health or access to medicine. This holds particularly true if the country
4 Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS Agreement:
Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1941, 945 (2000) ("Compulsory
licensing is defined generally as the granting of a license by a government to use a patent
without the patent-holder's permission" (citing Review of TRIPs, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
(June 9, 1999)).
5 See, e.g. Susan K. Finston, License to Steal, AM. ENTER. INST. (July 16, 2008),
http://www.aei.or /publication/1icense-to-steal-2/.http://www.aei.or/publication/1icense-
to-steal-2/.
6 Cf Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 508 (1991) (Citing CONG. GLOVE, 3 9 h
Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1867) (remarks of Rep. Farnswarth) ("The first duty of the
Government is to afford protection to its citizens.").
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does not directly benefit financially from the production or development of new
drugs.
Pharmaceutical companies are obviously averse to this idea, and have tried to
rally behind the threat of compelled, cheaper generic drugs leaking into protected
markets that would negatively affect profitability. 7 This threat, often called
"divergence," could create serious risks for pharmaceutical companies compelled
to enter low-income markets with the potential of only a small reward.
Pharmaceutical companies could further cite the related threat to innovation
that compulsory licensed generics would bring.9 After all, pharmaceutical
companies are uniquely reliant on patents for innovation.10 Pharmaceutical
7 See Clair Cassedy, Transcript of Bayer CEO Marjin Dekkers quote at the December
3, 2013, FT Event, regarding India compulsory license of Nexavar, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT'L (Feb. 7, 2014), http://keionline~org/node/1924 ("But you know the risk
in these situations is always spillover. If this generic Indian company is now going to sell
this product, then South Africa [can], and then New Zealand ... [a]nd that puts the whole
industry and patent rights of an industry at risk.").
8 See discussion infra section I.C (addressing the apparent threat of divergence).
9 Cf lain M Cockburn, Intellectual Property Right and Pharmaceuticals: Challenges
and Opportunities for Economic Research, WIPO'S THE ECONS. OF INTELL. PROP. 150,
160-161 (2009) (stating "At least as far back as Taylor and Silberston (1973) surveys of
industry participants about the impact of patents on R&D incentives have found the
pharmaceutical industry to be critically - and almost uniquely - dependent on patent
protection." (citing C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, Cambridge, UK, (1973).
10 Id.
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companies could also address the threat of countries using compulsory licensing
as a one-size-fits-all hammer to nail down the growing price of healthcare, a
serious threat which even middle-income countries may soon employ with more
frequency." However, so far these concerns are overshadowed by government
concerns over the health of its citizens.
A concerned company may then wish to explore strategies against compulsory
licenses. While other strategies to mitigate the potential harm of compulsory
licensing have been explored, the best strategy may be simply preemptively and
voluntarily licensing the drug patent to foreign generic manufacturers. Indeed,
other strategies against compulsory often fail to achieve as desirable an outcome,
instead acting mostly to create further animosity between the parties and unduly
hurting the company.12
By voluntarily licensing new drugs, the pharmaceutical company would
encourage cooperation between itself, generic manufacturers, and governments,
creating additional incentives for the enforcement of intellectual property rights;13
create additional sources of revenue, previously untapped ue to the high price of
brand name drugs;14 and could create additional goodwill towards the
" See discussion infra section II.A (addressing the increased incentives for countries
to employ compulsory licensing and how this could hurt the pharmaceutical industry).
12 See discussion infra sections III. C - E (discussing the benefits of voluntary
licensing when compared to other models).
13 See discussion infra II.C (discussing the benefits of cooperation for corporations).
14 See discussion infra section II.D (discussing the additional revenue available from
voluntary licensing).
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pharmaceutical company. s
I. LICENSING AFTER TRIPS
No company, organization, or person should be forced into a contract for
which they have no wish to join; 16 this is a fundamental tenet of contract law.17
Yet, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
1s Compare Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tavelt to $750, Overnight,
N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 20, 2015) (demonizing CEO Martin Shkreli's decision to inflate drug
prices on a 62 year old drug), with Brett Norman, Hillary Clinton Takes on Drug
Industry, POLITICO, (Sept. 22, 2015) http://www.politico.com/story/2015/09/hillary-
clinton-prescription-drugs-health-care-213910 (addressing Former Secretary Clinton's
reaction to Mr. Shkreli's price hike and plan to fight rising drug prices), and Catherine
Jewell, Gilead Targets Elimination of Hepatitis C, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.
MAGAZINE (Feb. 2015), http//www.wipoint/wipo magazinek
en/2015/01/article 0001.htnil (illustrating support for Gilead's decision to fight hepatitis
C with affordable drugs).
16 See, e.g. Robert Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PITT. L.
REV. 337, 339 (1969) ("[A] bargain was said to be unconscionable in an action at law if
it was 'such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand,
and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other." (citing Humes v. United States,
132 U.S. 4406, 4411 (1889)) [hereafter "Braucher"].
17 Thomas A. Baker, Consent Theory as Possible Cure for Unconscionable Terms in
Student-Athlete Contracts, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 619, 620 (2011) ("Lack of choice
is contractually problematic because the ssence of contract is volition" (citing JOHN E.
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 482 (3d. ed. 1990).
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("TRIPS"), 18 an agreement required for participation in the World Trade
Organization (WTO), provides countries with the very authority to force licensing
agreements upon patent owners for issues related to public health. However
unconscionable these compulsory licenses may seem, they are enforceable and
undeniable for pharmaceutical companies.19 They may also soon grow in
popularity.20
A. Compulsory Licensing
Despite significant support from the U.S. Government,21 the pharmaceutical
18 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 3, 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994) [hereinafter "TRIPS"].
19 Governments are not strictly bound by their own unconscionable provisions. See
NICHOLAS SEDDON, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL 308 (4th
ed. 2009) ("[I]f the purchase was for ordinary government purposes, it is not bound by
[the unconscionable] provision because the purchase could not be said to be part of
carrying on a business."); see also LARRY DIMATTEO & MARTIN HOGG, COMPARATIVE
CONTRACT LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 268 (2015) ("Despite the more
highly contextual analysis used in government contract law, in fact, there are few
successful claims of relief based upon claims of unconscionability in government
contracts.").
20 See discussion supra II.A (discussing the growing incentives for countries to
employ more compulsory licenses).
21 See WTO, THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS
FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS, 132 (Jayashree Watal & Antony
Taubman eds., 2015) ("Achieving a strong agreement on [intellectual property rights] in
the Uruguay Round negotiations was a top offensive objective for the United States").
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industry was not able to obtain the full spectrum of intellectual property
protection it might have wished for during the negotiations of TRIPS.22 The most
pertinent example of this shortcoming is the inclusion of the compulsory licensing
option on patents related to public health. Perhaps the industry hoped compulsory
licensing would be a small nuisance, relegated only to emergencies or desperate
need. Indeed, some initial observers claimed TRIPS applied strict standards for
the enablement of compulsory licensing,23 but recent developments on the
international scale have potentially proven otherwise.24
Of course, the concept of compulsory licensing has existed well before
TRIPS. Even before the official ratification of the WTO agreement, most
countries had the option to compulsory license a patent.25 For the most part, the
22 See generally infra notes 23 - 24.
23 Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPS
Agreement: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries Toward the
Patentability of Biotechnology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 46 (1998).
24 Cf Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceutical
inventions: evaluating the options, 37(2) J. LAW MED ETHICS 247, 248 (2009) ("[E]very
attempt to limit or constrain a state's power to issue compulsory licenses has invariably
resulted in a strengthening of that same power at the international evel." (citation
omitted)). See generally Bayer Corp. v. Minister of Commerce and Industry, Bhavan,
W.P. 1323 of 2013 H.C. Born. (15 July 2014) (applying work standard requirements as
grounds for compulsory licensing).
25 Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 8 Nw. J. OF INT'L L. & BUS. 666, 667 (1988) ("One aspect common
through-out the world ... is compulsory licensing.").
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justifications for these pre-TRIPS compulsory licenses were similar to the modem
justifications. The common arguments similarly addressed issues of public
interest, supply, and work requirements.26 Though some more prominent
countries, like the United States, resisted the option before the ratification of
TRIPS,27 the agreement opened the door to compulsory licenses for every country
that wishes to participate in the WTO.28
It is well established that strong patent and intellectual property rights are
integral to the innovation of pharmaceuticals.29 Very real concerns about efficacy
and safety have increased the cost of research, development and production well
26 Id. at 668 - 674.
27 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1979)
("Compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system, and we decline to manufacture
such a requirement").
28 See e.g. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887) ("By the Constitution a
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation legislation. Both are
declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land." (emphasis added); but see
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) ("while treaties "may comprise international
comintments ... they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing""
(citing Iguartua-De La Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145, 150 (CA1 2005).
29 See Richard Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, THE
ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012), http://www.theatlanticco business/archive/2012/07/why-
there-are-too-manyviaggtens-5 ("The prime example of an industry that
really does need such [patent] protection is pharmaceuticals").
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beyond the mere price of manufacture and distribution.30 Under the current
system, there is little incentive to invest in new research without patent
protection,31 especially with the ever present fear of a competitor appropriating
any new drug or development and selling the drug at reduced prices without any
consideration or concern towards the cost of development.32
On the other hand, intellectual property protection is meant as an incentive for
innovation, not as a reward.33 This holds particularly true for patent protection.
3 See id.; Cost of Development and Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug Is $2.6
Billion, TUFTS UNIVERSITY (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete storv/pr tufts csdd 2014 cost study (estimating the
price of innovation for a new drug at a total cost of $2,558 million). But see MEDECINS
SANS FRONTIERES, R&D Cost Estimates: MSF Response to Tufts CSDD Study on Cost to
Develop a New Drug (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.or/article/rd-
cost-estimates-msf-response-tufts-csdd-study-cost-develop-new-drug ("The cost of
developing products is variable, but experience shows that new drugs can be developed
for as little as $50 million, or up to $186 million if you take failure into account.").
31 But see Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in
Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate
Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 301 (1998) (addressing concerns over exclusivity in
drugs, and suggesting a model which would promote innovation not through market
exclusivity, but through government rewards).
32 WIPO, supra note 9, at 160-161 (2009).
3 U.S. CONS. art. I § 8. ("Congress shall have the power ... to promote the progress
of Science and useful Art, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
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While this may seem like a simple matter of semantics, the distinction can have
some significant ramifications, especially regarding what deserves patent
protection.34 For example, a reward might be per se granted for any innovation as
it is deserved upon a successful discovery or invention, but an incentive may -
and should be - weighed against other considerations.35
exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (arguing that the protections rewarded to intellectual property
creators are of "secondary consideration" when compared to the potential advancement
of public welfare); Bonito Boots v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
(arguing "The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage
innovation and avoidance of monopolies."); 37 C.F.R. 1.56(a) (2001) (stating "a patent
by its very nature is affected with a public interest."). See also Bayer Corp. v. Union of
India, Bhavan, I.P.A Order No. 45 of 2013 (Mar. 4, 2013) (arguing that "patent rights
were created 'not in the interest of the inventor, but in the interest of the national
economy.") (citation omitted); Bayer Corp. v. Minister of Commerce and Industry,
Bhavan, W.P. 1323 of 2013 H.C. Bom. (15 July 2014) ("[A]n inherent objective in the
grant of patent is the obligation of the patent holder to utilize the invention to meet the
needs of society."). See generally Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499, U.S.
340, 349 (1991) (stating the primary objective of the intellectual property clause "is not
to reward the labor of authors but to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Art.").
3 Cf Craig Allen Nard, THE LAW OF PATENTS, 33-35 (3d. ed. 2014) (discussing the
incentives for patents in the Economics of Patent Law chapter as protection against free-
riding, disclosure, and access through commercialization).
35 See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. CAS. 1018, (C.C. Mass. 1817) ("the invention should
not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society"
(emphasis added).
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In the pharmaceutical space this could mean that the price of innovation
should be weighed against he health of the public. Proponents of compulsory
drug licensing could argue that drug monopolies are simply intolerably against
public policy; that using a patent to monopolize a drug without concern to
availability, cost, or use is a potential violation of the intent of the patent system
as dictated by the courts and international law. 36
It is with this debate in mind that TRIPS requires pharmaceutical products be
patent eligible, but also allows for the compulsory licensing of patents in the
interest of public health. Such licensing is only allowed during times of
emergency, or through the express authorization of the government.37 Few would
or should argue against the need for compulsory licensing in emergencies. For
example, a mass epidemic, which would create a sudden need which could
outstrip a company's potential production capabilities could be a compelling
reason for a compulsory license. Even the United States of America, well known
as a "bastion of intellectual property,"38 has taken advantage of compulsory
licensing, most famously in response to potential terrorist anthrax attacks.39
36 See supra note 33.
37 See TRIPS supra note 18 Art. 8(1) ("Members may, in formulating or amending
their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition").
38 ANIL K. GUPTAET AL., THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL DOMINANCE: TRANSFORMING
GLOBAL PRESENCE INTO GLOBAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 261 (2d ed. 2008).
39 See Corpoflaxacin: the Dispute Over Compulsory Licenses, CPTECH,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/ (viewed Oct. 14, 2015); see also e.g. James
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TRIPS requires a country to have attempted a voluntary license before issuing
a compulsory license. This requirement exists regardless of whether the
compulsory license to be issued is through some unstated public health
authorization of the government or because of some emergency.40 However, any
other requirements which may apply are mostly left to the flexibility of the
individual nations.41 India's intellectual property act, for example, allows for the
application of a compulsory license if, after three years from the date of the
patent's issue, "reasonable requirements of the public with regard to the patented
invention is [sic] not being satisfied, that the patented invention is not available to
the public at the reasonably affordable price, or that the patented invention is not
worked in the territory."42 Essentially, India requires that a patented technology
Packard Love, Recent examples of the use of compulsory licenses on patents,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, htt2://www.keionineorg/iise-
docs/recent cis 8marO7.pdf (last viewed Oct. 14, 2015).
40 See TRIPS supra note 18 Art. 31(b) ("Where the law of a Member allows for other
use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder,
including use by the government or third parties authorized by the government ... [only]
if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the
right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have
not been successful within a reasonable period of time.").
41 DOHA WTO Ministerial 2001 5(b) (Nov. 20, 2001) ("Each member has the right
to grant compulsory licences [sic] and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which
such licences [sic] are granted.")
42 Bayer Corp. v. Minister of Commerce and Industry, Bhavan, W.P. 1323 of 2013
H.C. Bom. 5 (15 July 2014).
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be available in India at a reasonably affordable price.43
India's requirements are potentially the most favorable towards compulsory
licensing, bordering on - if not out-right requiring - an obligation to use.44
Though this conflicts with the United States' laws45 , there is currently no
obligation under the language of TRIPS or in WTO proceedings which would
prevent such an interpretation of the agreement's requirements. The United States,
worried about its native pharmaceutical industry, has attempted to pressure some
nations to adopt a higher standard, which would raise the bar for compulsory
licensing.46 However, until the unlikely day this "TRIPS-plus" standard is
internationally implemented under the WTO or universally ratified through
treaties, India is well within its rights to interpret its own patent protection as it
has.47 Whether other countries will also adopt such lenient legislation as India is
43 Id.
44 The Patents Act, § 146, INDIA CODE (1970); Patents Rules, § 131(2), INDIA CODE
(2003).
45 35 U.S.C. §154(a)(1) (2015) (granting the patent assignee the "right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout he
United States" (emphasis added), but not the right to use).
46 MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERES: ACCESS CAMPAIGN, TRIPS, TRIPS Plus and
Doha (July 2011), http://www.msfaccess.org/content/trips-trips-plus-and-doha.
47 Ramnath Subbu, U.S. Pharma Companies Benefit From Large Indian Generic
Market, THE HINDU (INDIA) (Mar. 8, 2014),
http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/us-pharma-companies-benefit-from-large-
indian-genericmarket/article5764662ece (quoting Mr. Diliip Shah, Secretary-General of
the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance) ("No member country of the WTO, including the
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unclear, but likely. The immediate temporary benefits of affordable, potentially
life-saving drugs far out-weigh the future risks especially for those governments
who rely on the short-term interests and immediate concerns of their electorate.48
It is a curious fact that few TRIPS dispute claims are brought before the
WTO.49 Fewer still rely on a theory of TRIPS violation.50 This is likely because
the WTO does not often rely on a theory of precedent when deciding its cases.51
This makes it difficult to predict the outcome of any WTO case. Such uncertainty,
coupled with the WTO's willingness to support native intellectual property
flexibility and the availability of drugs,52 and the risk of a negative decision with
which all WTO member states can rely upon in deciding the scope of their
obligations,53 increases the potential risk for pharmaceutical companies well
U.S. has even disputed it before the WTO. It must therefore be presumed that India's
patent law is TRIPS-compliant.").
48 See generally Alessandra Bonfiglionli, Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and
Political Myopia, 123 THE ECON. J. 373, 373 (2013) (addressing the economic interests
and political rational of short-term biases and political myopia).
49 Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but Didn't Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual
Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. INT'L DIsP. SETTLEMENT 389, 393 (2010) [hereafter
"Pauwelyn"].
' 0 Id. at 393, 396 - 97.
51 But see Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO
Agreement, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17., 33 (2002) ("in practical terms, prior decisions are
not lightly departed from").
52 See TRIPS, supra note 18; cf Pauwelyn supra note 49, at 403.
53 See Pauwelyn, supra note 49, at 399.
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beyond expectable risks.
Until companies are willing to risk the potential consequences of a WTO court
decision, they are limited to fighting back in local courts where they are bound by
the nation's interpretation of TRIPS and must assume that the nation's policies are
TRIPS compliant.54 Indeed, fighting back is not a good strategy. In fact, the many
attempts to limit the flexibility of TRIPS licensing seems only to strengthen the
"offending" country's claims.5 5
As for disputes not litigated before the WTO, it is likely, ignoring the
possibility of extreme cases, a domestic court will not rule against increasing the
flexibility of compulsory licenses within its borders. Trying to argue against a
country's compulsory licensing of a drug in that country's courts does not seem a
54 Ramnath Subbu, U.S. Pharma Companies Benefit from Large Indian Generic
Market, THE HINDU (INDIA) (Mar. 14, 2015),
http://www.thehindu .com/business/Industry/us -pharma-companies-benefit-froni-large-
iidian- ,eneric-rarket/artice, 7646621ece (quoting Mr. Diliip Shah, Secretary-General of
the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance) ("No member country of the WTO, including the
U.S. has even disputed it before the WTO. It must therefore be presumed that India's
patent law is TRIPS-compliant.").
s Cf Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical
Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 248 (2009) ("[E]very
attempt to limit or constrain a state's power to issue compulsory licenses has invariably
resulted in a strengthening of that same power at the international level. Mr. Diliip Shah,
Secretary-General of the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance").
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winning strategy.56 A new strategy is required.
In fact, companies have employed a number of strategies. The most popular,
perhaps, is the wait-and-see; the most aggressive is to retaliate. Both are flawed,
especially when compared to the voluntary licensing method.
B. Voluntary Licensing: Illustrations Using Gilead's Model
Voluntary licensing is, as the name describes, the practice of extending a
licensing agreement by the patent holder to third-party generic participants for the
expressed purpose of the third-party's use to create a generic version of the
patented product.57 Voluntary licensing has been explored as a strategy against
compulsory licensing in the past, but usually as a response to direct threats of
compulsory licensing.5 8 However, it is more beneficial for companies, who are
worried about the compulsory licensing of valuable patents, to voluntary license
the drug before the expressed threat of compulsion.59
The obvious benefit is the inherent leverage voluntary licensing grants the
pharmaceutical company while negotiating the contract. Pre-emptive voluntary
licensing creates a better position in negotiating contracts that would not exist if
56 See id.
5 See TAHIR AMIN, VOLUNTARY LICENSING PRACTICES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
SECTOR: AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO PROVIDING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE
MEDICINES?, OXFAM GB at 3 (2007).
58 See discussion infra section II.C. Benefitting from Cooperation.
59 See discussion infra section II.B - D.
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the offer is only made after the threat of compulsion.60 However, the patent owner
also gains other advantages, especially when compared to the other strategies that
have been explored.
Gilead, for example, has contracts with eleven companies to produce a generic
version of its hepatitis C drugs.61 The companies are only permitted to
manufacture and ship the generic version of their drug to ninety-one expressly
defined countries.62 Gilead's contract also sets the royalties to be 7% of the
profits;63 places requirements on how third-party sellers can be chosen;64 includes
protections of Gilead's intellectual property rights 65 and the drug's reputation;66
and shields Gilead from liability.67 Gilead, thus, created a price differential plan
based, not on government influence or dictates, but on what works best for
6o See discussion infra section II.C Benefitting from Cooperation.
61 Chronic Hepatitis C Treatment Expansion: Generic Manufacturing for
Developing Countries, GILEAD (Aug. 2015),
http://www. ,ilead~conV-/media/files/pdfs/other/hcv -enericagreementfactsheet.lpdf?la=en.
62 License Agreement between Gilead and Licensee app. 1 (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://www. gilead.comV/media/files/Tdfs/other/201 4 original hcv licensing agreeinen
t.pdf?la-en [hereinafter "License Agreement"].
63 Id. at § 4.1.
64 Id. at § 2.3(d)-(f).
6s Id. at §§ 7-10.2, 7.5, 7.6.
66 See id. at § 6.
67 License Agreement § 8.2 ("Licensee shall be solely responsible in respect of any
product liability or any other statutory liability under any regulation").
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Gilead, the generics, and potential customers that cannot afford Gilead's brand
name drug.
The most common alternative strategies include the retaliation and wait-and-
see strategies. These strategies have been explored by other companies in
Thailand and Brazil respectively. Though these strategies may have potential
benefits when compared to simply fighting against compulsory licensing, the two
strategies fail on significant aspects.
Perhaps the only real weakness in Gilead's licensing agreement is the section
on "Anti-Diversion." 6 8 This section of the contract requires that "the parties shall
discuss in good faith programs that [the] Licensee may implement to minimize
diversion of Product."6 9 Though such open terms are typically enforceable,70 this
particular clause may not be helpful for Gilead. Of course, a contract cannot force
a participant into future contracts,71 but can only require "good faith" negotiations
in the future, and does not require agreement on what may be appropriate to
prevent diversion, especially in regards to yet unforeseen circumstances.
However, diversion is not something the pharmaceutical industry should worry
too much about.72
68 License Agreement § 6.1(a).
69 Id.
7o See SIGA Techs., Inc. v Pharmathene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 343-44 (Del. 2013)
(reaffirming a previous holding that a contract obligation to negotiate in good faith is
enforceable).
71 See Ford, infra note 4, at 945.
72 See discussion infra section I.C.
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C. Addressing Diversion
Pharmaceutical companies have publically decried the use of compulsory
licensing, citing their fear of generic divergence.73 However, this worry is
typically out-weighed by the benefits of licensing, and is potentially over-stated.
After all, pharmaceutical products are traditionally protected from divergence by
two steady pillars of law: 74 (1) the lack of international exhaustion on generics
versions of patented products,75 and (2) drug administrations' specific interests in
7 See Cassedy infra note 7. See also TRIPS supra note 184, Art. 31(f) ("Where the
law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the right holder ... any such use shall be authorized predominantly for
the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing use.").
74 TRIPS itself generally prevented the exportation of compulsorily licensed drugs,
but the standards for protection are ambiguous enough to warrant more discussion than is
appropriate for this paper. See Jerome H. Reichman, Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented
Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and Overview of the
Practice in Canada and the USA, in ISSUE PAPER No. 5, UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON
INTELL. PROP. RTS. & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 3 (June 2003) (addressing the limitations
under TRIPs on exportation of licensed goods); Charitini Stavropoulou & Tommaso
Valletti, Compulsory Licensing and Access to Drugs, 16 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 83, 85
(2015) ("Products made under compulsory licensing should be manufactured mainly for
domestic use. However, this was weakened in a landmark decision made by the WTO in
2003: the so called 'Paragraph 6 problem' allowed the generic copy made under
compulsory licenses to be exported to developing countries that lack production
capacity.").
7s Infra notes 78 - 93 and associated text.
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preventing the import of unapproved drugs on issues of safety.76 Rather, the more
prominent concern is the potential use of compulsory licensing, not as a tool to
promote access, but as a hammer to beat down prices.
i. Exhaustion
Exhaustion,77 despite sounding rather ominous, is a simple enough concept to
6 See Letter from Randall W. Lutter, Deputy Comm'r for Policy, Office of Pub.
Health Serv., FDA, to Governor Linda Lingle of Hawaii (Aug. 14, 2008),
http://www.fda. ,ov/Drs/DruSafetv/ucnil79204.htm (addressing the threat of
diversion into the United States by stating "Virtually all prescription drugs imported for
personal use into the U.S. from Canada or other foreign countries violate the Act because
they are unapproved new drugs (21 U.S.C. § 355), labeled incorrectly (21 U.S.C. §§ 352,
353), or dispensed without a valid prescription (21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)). Importing or
causing the importation of a drug into the United States that is unapproved and/or does
not comply with the labeling requirements and dispensing requirements in the Act is a
prohibited act under 21 U.S.C. §§ 33 1(a), and/or (d), and may be enjoined or
prosecuted."); see also 21 U.S.C. §332(a), 333(a).1; see also Abigail Alliance v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied Abigail Alliance v. von
Eschenbach, 552 U.S. 1159 (2008) ("we cannot say that the government's interest does
not bear a rational relation to a legitimate state interest ... Although terminally ill
patients desperately need curative treatments . . . their deaths can certainly be hastened
by the use of a potentially toxic drug.").
7 Christopher J. Clugston, International Exhaustion, Parallel Imports, and the
Conflict Between the Patent and Copyright Laws of the United States, 4 BEIJING L. REV.
95, 95 (defining "exhaustion" as the termination of certain patent rights, like the right to
exclude in commerce, after "an authorized sale of a product" by either the patent holder
or a legitimate licensee).
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understand. Essentially, government wishing to balance the monopolistic powers
of intellectual property with antitrust principles have applied a "first-sale"
doctrine to most intellectual property.78 The idea was that intellectual property
owners, after having already benefitted from the sale of their intellectual property,
have "exhausted" some of their rights. The most pertinent of these exhausted
rights is the right to prevent the re-sell of the invention.79 Most countries apply
exhaustion to those products sold domestically, but whether sales made on foreign
soil should affect those exhaustible rights in all countries is still at debate. Here,
the worry is simple: pharmaceutical companies are concerned about the potential
of competitors infiltrating low-cost markets, to purchase and resell the drug for
profit without fear of litigation because the patent owner has exhausted their
rights.
Currently, no international agreement on the question of international
exhaustion of patent rights exists; so there is no international forum in which to
pursue this issue.8 0 In fact, the effects of an international exhaustion regime, as it
would apply to the global market, is not yet well understood.8 1 The German
8 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 487 (2001). ANN. SURV. ON AM. L.
487, 491 (2011) (providing an overview of first-sale doctrine).
7 9 Id. at 488.
8o See TRIPS supra note 18, Art. 6 ("For the purposes of dispute settlement under this
Agreement, subject to the provisions of Article 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall
be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.").
81 See Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Free Trade In Patented Goods: International
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courts, for example, have applied international exhaustion only to those patents
sold by legal licensees,82 whereas the United States, at the time of this writing,
does not allow international exhaustion to touch patents.83 In fact, the United
States has attempted significant steps to influence foreign governments to prevent
international exhaustion from touching patents in other countries. 84
Some might say that the rights of international patent owners have come under
attack in recent years, as more courts throughout the world have started to apply
Exhaustion for Patents, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317, 320 (2014).
82 This protection can be further strengthened by terms set in a voluntary licensing
agreement, but would only allow legal action against he licensee as the reseller lacks
privity to the original licensing agreement, but may allow the licensor to attach additional
liability upon the licensee. See generally Thomas Musmann, No Mercy: Exhaustion of
patent rights and burden of proof, Kluwer Patent Blog, (Mar. 14, 2014)
http://kluwefpatentblog.conV201 4/03/14/no-mercy-exhaustion-of-patent-rights-.and-
burden-of-proof/; see also Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prod., Inc., 816 F.3d 721
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
83 See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm., 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("United States patent rights are not exhausted by products of foreign provenance.");
Ninestar Tech. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., 619 (U.S. 2013). (denying certiorari,
implying the Supreme Courts intention to limit international exhaustion to copyrights.").
But see Lexmark International, Inc. v. Impression Prod., Inc., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
84 See Rajec, supra note 81 at 320 ("[T]he United States Trade Representative is
currently negotiating a trade agreement - the Trans-Pacific Partnership-requiring that
member countries not recognize international exhaustion in intellectual property rights."
(citation omitted).
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the international exhaustion standards to patents.8 5 This would obviously be
problematic for those patent owners which cannot afford to register their patents
in every country where one may infringe,86 and potentially for those patent
owners with public health patents.87
There is some question as to whether exhaustion should even apply to
compelled or compulsory licensed drugs, or even if any exhaustion would apply
to generic versions of a patented product.8 8 Despite good arguments on either
85 See Apotex Inc. v. Eli Lilly Canada Inc., [2013] F.C. 282 (deciding that
international exhaustion shall apply to patents in Canada); Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Impression Prod., Inc., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
86 See Oral Argument at 27:30, Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prod., Inc., 816
F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (No. 14-1617),
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2014-1617 022015 3
(presiding over the question of applying international exhaustion via common law cases
while expressing explicit concerns over the expense inherent in pursuing patent rights in
all international jurisdictions)
87 See Oral Argument at 19:16, Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prod., Inc., 816 F.3d
721 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (No. 14-1617),
http:/oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspxfl=20 4-1617 lO22Ol5.in 3
(addressing concerns of reuse of pharmaceutical devices and public safety and its relation
to pharmaceutical patents).
8 This topic is subject to enough supposition and interest as to warrant further
discussion than is appropriate in this paper. However, it is sufficient to know that
generics are unlikely to affect the condition of patent pharmaceuticals' exhaustion
principles. See Cynthia Ho, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International
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side, it is unlikely any government would apply such broad conditions to
exhaustion principles. For now, pharmaceutical companies are protected from
exhaustion in regards to compulsory licensed drugs.
ii. Administrative Protection
However, should this first pillar fail, pharmaceuticals are still generally
protected under a second pillar: administrative law. Various laws and interests
protect against the divergence of generic drugs into most markets. For example,
the United States Food and Drug Association ("FDA") requires generic
companies to register generic drugs.89 The FDA, however, cannot grant
registration for generics which infringe upon existing and valid U.S. patents, and
generic companies cannot market their drugs without registration.90 While certain
exceptions do exist regarding drugs not available in the United States, none of
Agreements on Patents and Related Rights 108 (2011); Ignacio S. Sapalo, Patent
exhaustion and its role in drug patent wars, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(Sept. 1, 2014), htp://www managingipconIArticle/3382715/Patent-exhaustion-and-its-
role-in-drug-patent-wars htinl ("Clearly ... the patent exhaustion principle does not
apply to a product which is not put out in the market by the patentee").
89 To market a generic drug in the United States, the FDA requires a company to
submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) which must include "a
certification ... with respect to each patent which claims the listed drug ... for which the
applicant is seeking approval (I) that such patent information has not been filed, (II) that
such patent has expired, (III) of the date on which such patent will expire, or (IV) that
such patent is invalid." 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A).
90 Supra note 76; Warning Letter from David J. Horowitz, Dir., CDER Office of
Compliance to Harry Lee Jones, Store Manager, Rx Depot, Inc. (Mar. 21, 2003).
2016 STRATEGY AGAINST COMPULSORY LICENSING 89
these exceptions would apply to drugs under the threat of divergence.91
Thus, the biggest potential threat of divergence comes from personal use,
which the FDA is reluctant, or unable, to stop.92 However, this is unlikely to
greatly affect pharmaceutical companies, as this policy is very limited, and should
not touch drugs susceptible to compulsory licensing. The cost to wages and travel,
coupled with the uncertainty inherent in generics and general inability to travel,
will probably outweigh the potential benefits from the purchase of foreign
generics for most consumers.93
II. THE STRATEGY: A COMPARISON
A. The Potential Threat of Compulsory Licenses
The less stated but greater concern for pharmaceutical companies is the
impending threat of compulsory licenses. Historically, compulsory licenses have
not been abused. Rather, many activists encourage countries to exercise the
91 Supra note 89.
92 See generally Personal Importation Policy (PIP) Frequently Asked Questions,
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/-
downloads/Dru gs/GuidanceComp~lianceRegulatorvlnformation/lmportsandExportsComplI
iance/UCM297909.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
93 Cf Erol Kohli & Allison Buller, Patterns of Generic Versus Brand Name Over-
the-Counter Drugs, 106 S. MED. J. 155 (2013) (postulating that though price is the "most
influential factor" in determining which OTC to purchase, other factors like
advertisements, safety, and preferred company names will "persuade others to pay more
for brand name drugs").
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compulsory licensing right more often.94 With the growing cost of health care,
more and more countries may feel compelled to issue compulsory licenses. It
would start with low income countries licensing high demand drugs.95 With each
subsequent successful license, countries will become emboldened,96 licensing
seemingly insignificant drugs.97 Then, middle-income countries could start
issuing licenses on expensive drugs, which could seriously hurt profitability.
Though a single country compulsory licensing a single drug is not so troubling,
dozens of countries compulsory licensing on hundred drugs could seriously hurt
94 See Ed Silverman, Bristol-Myers Faces a Compulsory License for an AIDS drug in
Peru, THE WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2015),
http://blogs.wsj ~comipharmalot/20 15/05/2 1/bristol-mvyers-faces-a-compulsory-license-
for-an-aids-drug-in-peru/ ("Several consumer groups are urging the government o issue a
compulsory license for an HIV medicine (Reyataza: priced at $10 a pill) sold by Bristol-
Myers Squibb").
95 Kristina M. Lybecker, Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory licensing in Canada and
Thailand: comparing regimens to ensure legitimate use of the WTO rules, 37 J. LAW
MED. ETHICS 222 (2009).
96 Patralekha Chatterjee, India's First Compulsory License Upheld, But Legal Fights
Likely to Continue, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (May 4, 2013), http://wwwip-
watch~or /201 3/03/04/lindias-first-com-pulsory-licence-up~held&butlegal-fi hts-likely-to-
continue/ (quoting Leena Menghaney, India campaign manager, M6decins Sans
Frontieres, "the decision means that the way has been paved for compulsory licences to
be issued on other drugs").
97 See Shibu Thomas, High Court's Nexavar Ruling Strikes a Blow For Patient's
Rights in India, THE TIMES OF INDIA (July 17, 2014), (addressing the compulsory
licensing of the "orphan drug" Nexavar, a treatment drug for liver and kidney cancer).
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the pharmaceutical industry.98
Voluntary licensing protects pharmaceutical companies from this potential
proliferation of the compulsory licensing system. Voluntarily licensing grants the
patent owner additional control over which countries the licensee can export to or
even to which markets the licensee can enter.99 This allows the licensor to steer
the exports away from potentially profitable markets and provides additional
potential awards in litigation through a theory of contracts.100 However, voluntary
licenses which should include some exportation clause also attacks the most
98 See Cassedy supra note 7 ("If this generic Indian company is now going to sell this
product, then South Africa [can], and then New Zealand ... that puts the whole industry
and patent rights of an industry at risk.").
99 Eric Palmer, Gilead to require proof of citizenship to buy Sovaldi in poor
countries, FERCEPHARMA (Mar. 18, 2015), http://wwwfiercepharma-.con~story/gilead-
regiuire-proofcitizenshipbuy.sovaldi-poor-countries/2O 1 5-O3-18.
100 Compulsory licensed pharmaceuticals may have an additional protection from
international exhaustion when compared to voluntary licensing. Most international
exhaustion regimes require a sale by a party with a legitimate claim to the patent. While a
generic company may have a right to production through a compulsory license, they
should lack the voluntary component required to be considered a "legitimate" licensee.
However, there is no known litigation addressing this issue at the moment. Such a
distinction may slightly weaken the protection of voluntarily licensed pharmaceuticals.
See generally Rajec, supra note 81 at 326 n. 39 (2014) ("[A]n international exhaustion
regime would mean that an authorized sale abroad exhausts domestic patent rights so that
importation does not constitute infringement, even if the authorization was limited to
sales in a particular foreign market.").
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common incentive for compulsory licenses: affordability.
B. The Lost Cause: Bayer Suing Under TRIPS in India
The main problem with compulsory licensing is its inherent confrontation
with patent protection. For example, under India's law, compulsory licensing
allows the government to revoke the intellectual property right in favor of better
prices.101 This seems contrary to TRIPS requirement that pharmaceuticals be
offered patent protection.102 However, suing under TRIPS is potentially the worst
strategy for companies. Though a country's continued use of compulsory
licensing may strain trade relations between nation states and companies,103
countries are not likely to abandon compulsory licensing and companies are just
101 See Cassedy, supra note 7 ("In our case, the Indian government said 'No no, your
patent is valid . .. we just think you charge too much").
102 Pharmaceutical patents and the TRIPS Agreement, WTO (Sept 21, 2006),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/pharma ato 186 e~htm.
103 See Bernie Becker, India's policies boxing out US companies, The Hill (Dec. 22,
2014), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/227930-indias-policies-boxing-out-us-companies
("India's unfair policies increasingly are harming U.S. exports of a wide array of
products" (quoting Chris Moore of the National Association of Manufacturers)); Andrew
Ward & Amy Kazmin, Bayer loses bid to block cheap version of cancer drug in India,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014), http://wwwftco cms/s/0/36a2d942-8202-1 e4-
a9bb-O144feabdc0.htm1#axzz3vrZ4459O ("There is a huge amount of pressure from
multinational companies discouraging their Indian partners from filing those
applications") (quoting Leena Menghacy of Medecins Sans Fronti6res).
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as unlikely to win a TRIPS related suit.104 Rather, with each success, India and
countries with similar interests are likely to further push the boundaries of the
reasonable interpretation of TRIPS.os While this may help those concerned with
access to medicine in the short-term, it could lead to the slow degradation of the
innovative pharmaceutical industry.
Though the WTO has a system in which TRIPS related decisions can be
appealed, there is a lack of incentives to bring such an appeal for fear of a solid,
global model for which other countries could emulate.106 Thus, companies are
generally limited to fighting back in local courts, hoping to inspire some judicial
sympathy or to limit precedent o the borders of the presiding nation. This strategy
10 See discussion infra section II.B.
105 Ed Silverman, Will India Issue a Compulsory License for an AstraZeneca
Diabetes Pill?, THE WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2015),
http://blogs.wsj .comipharmalot/201 5/07/09/will-india-issue-a-compulsory-license-for-an-
astrazeneca-diabetes-pill/ ("Lee Pharma filed an application for a license to manufacture
a version of Onglyza, an AstraZeneca diabetes pill, on the grounds that the drug is not
sold at an affordable price in India and that supplies are inadequate). But see EJ Lane,
India's Lee Pharma turned down on CL challenge to AZ's Onglyza,
FIERCEPHARMAASIA (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.fiercepharmaasia.co story/indias-
lee-pharma-turned-down-cl-challenge-azs-onglyza/2015-08-18 ("India's Controller of
Patents has turned down a, compulsory license application by Lee Pharma to make a
version of AstraZeneca's Onglyza, citing competing substitutes already in the market and
patent terms").
16 See discussion supra section II.A (addressing the possible threat of countries more
commonly issuing compulsory licenses).
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is likely to fail almost every time. For what fair judicial court is so divorced from
the purpose of government as to rule against the interests of its people over
foreign interests.
In the likely failure of this "fight back" strategy, the company is now
irrevocably tied to the terms of the licensing agreement. The company has to
fulfill terms for which it had no say over; no negotiable control; and no right to
argue price, participating parties, or production.107 It is thrust into a market which
may not be profitable to enter, and is subject to the very real control of the ruling
government. This cannot be considered a desirable outcome, and should probably
be avoided at any reasonable cost. It also encourages additional compulsory
licenses with each failed claim.
For example, in Bayer's lawsuit against Natco Pharmaceuticals Limited, an
Indian generics company, the court established the prevailing interpretation of the
law. 108 According to the Indian court, the law requires the patent holder to make
107 See supra note 18, at § 5: Patents Art. 31(b) ("use without authorization of the
right holder ... may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of
time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use")
(emphasis added).
1os Natco Pharma. Ltd v. Bayer Corp., Indian Patent Office, C.L.A. No. 1 of 2011 (12
March 2012) ("Natco v. Bayer") affd Bayer Corp. v. Minister of Commerce and
Industry, Bhavan, W.P. 1323 of 2013 H.C. Bom. (15 July 2014); see also Mansi Sood,
Natco Pharma LTD. v. Bayer Corporation and the Compulsory Licensing Regime in
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reasonable steps to "work" the patent within India or risk compulsory licensing.109
This requirement includes an expectation of availability. The Bayer's case sets a
precedential interpretation of the law, providing India with another weapon with
which to attack American pharmaceutical companies' prices. Though it is likely
another company would have fared as poorly, such precedent is only possible if a
company is willing to submit to the judgment of a court.
Bayer had the patent. Bayer had the opportunity to market, price, and provide
the licensed drug in India. It had no economic reason to do so, and thus chose not
to.110 Bayer had no reason to fight back. It could have offered to negotiate a
license, delaying the court's precedent until another unwitting company chose to
pursue judicial activism. Bayer did not, and Bayer lost.
Bayer's CEO, Marjin Dekkers, claims the decision will not significantly
change Bayer's marketing strategy. Mr. Dekkers claims that "investors . . . don't
care about these issues all that much."" Indeed, this may be true, as Bayer's
stock has shown a net growth since Natco v. Bayer was decided.112 However, his
statement is misleading. The main concerns regarding compulsory licensing do
not directly concern the worries of investors, but rather the attack on potential
India, 6 NUJS L. REV. 99, (2013).
109 Id.
110 See Cassedy, supra note 7 ("So now, is this going to have a big effect on our
business model? No, because we did not develop this product for the Indian market").
1 Id.
112 Bayer: Science For a Better Life, INVESTOR.BAYER.COM (Nov 8, 2015),
http://www.investor.bayer.com/en/stock/share-price/charts/.
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profitability. A single drug being compulsory licensed in a single country which
could not have afforded the drug is unlikely to injury a large international
company. However, continuous compulsory licenses on blockbuster drugs, issued
in any number of countries could have an extremely detrimental effect.
Additionally, the more compulsory generics exist the harder it will be for a
company to control the threat of divergence. While investors may not be
concerned about "these issues,"113 it is obvious that companies should be.
Indeed, the only benefit for companies, under this "fight-back" strategy, is a
potentially stronger protection from international exhaustion of their patents.114
This reason alone should not be sufficient to hold this strategy as a viable one.
The fight-back strategy fails on cooperation, sets unwanted precedence, lacks
leverage in negotiations, fails to increase revenue, and further creates animosity
between patent owners and countries. Rather, all other strategies rely on the sheer
undesirableness of a compulsory license and the unlikely success of this strategy.
C. Benefitting from Cooperation: Learning from Roche in Brazil
It has been stated that "reciprocity . . . is the key to every relationship."115
While a superficial understanding of economic theory might indicate a need for
selfishness and opportunism, a more modern analysis of game theory requires
113 See Cassedy, supra note 111 and associated text.
114 See supra notes 85 - 88.
115 Martin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger A theory of sequential reciprocity, 47
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 268, 268 (2004) (citing L.A. CONFIDENTIAL (Regency
Enterprises 1997)).
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reciprocity and trust,116 especially in those relationships which will continue
beyond a known number of encounters. Indeed, corporations and countries, much
like people, are likely to learn from each new encounter, adapting their strategies
on considerations of effectiveness and reputation.117 After extensive research and
modeling, the strategy considered most effective has been labeled "TIT FOR
TAT" 118 by Professor Axelrod of the University of Michigan.119
TIT FOR TAT uses a pattern involving five potential options: (1) "don't rock
the boat," or be nice; (2) "be provocable," return nice behavior with nice
behavior, and retaliate when the other party provokes but be willing to apologize
occasionally; (3) "accept an apology," resume interactions after cooperation has
been restored; (4) "forget," forgive past behavior after mutual cooperation is well
established; and (5) "accept a rut," if no chance of reconciliation exists, remove
one's self from the game.120 As complicated as this pattern may seem, the basic
principle is rather simple. First, do not be the initial aggressor. If aggression or
conflict occurs, do not submit ideally, but if the opportunity for reconciliation
occurs, take it. If further aggression occurs and is unfixable, defect away from the
position. Or, as simply as possible, TIT FOR TAT says to try and be nice.
116 Id. at 268 - 269.
117 ROBERT M. AXELROD, The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-based Models of
Competition and Collaboration 14 (1997).
..s Id. at 20.
119 Prof. Axelrod is a professor of political science and the Walgreen Professor for the
Study of Human Understanding at the University of Michigan.
120 See, supra note 117 at 20 (2007).
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TIT FOR TAT is not a new concept in the legal field. Perhaps its most
obvious applications are in the realm of transactional law,121 but TIT FOR TAT
has huge implication in health law policy, drug availability, and licensing
doctrines. TIT FOR TAT should not be ignored.
Realistically, if a company waits for the country to make the first move, it is
likely the country will move towards aggression, which should, under TIT FOR
TAT, incite "provocation." In the case of pharmaceuticals, this could mean
compulsory licensing leading to litigation. The immediate incentives for countries
are just too enticing.122 However, if the company chooses to make the first move
it can weaken those incentives through native support and attrition, or by simply
removing the need.
There are obvious benefits towards cooperation beyond the theoretical. The
most obvious benefit from cooperation is the potential support of native,
cooperative parties.123 Native parties, for example, are better equipped in dealing
121 E.g. Charles W. L. Hill, Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invidisble Hand:
Implications for Transaction Cost Theory, 15 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 500, 505 - 508
(1990).
122 See discussion supra notes 21 - 48 and associated text.
123 Compare Dianne Depra, Gilead Fights for Hepa C Drug Patents: Activists
Concerned About Drug Accessibility, TECHTIMES (May 22, 2015),
http://www.techtinesconarticles/54585/20150522/gilead-fights-for-hepa-c-dru2-
patents -activists-concerned-about-drug-accessibilitv.htm ("In January, a patent
application for Sovaldi was not awarded to Gilead, with India's patent office saying the
drug is not innovative enough.") with EJ Lane, New Gilead patent challenger pops up as
Delhi court forces a rehearing, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 3, 2015),
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with the eccentricities of their governments. Native parties have better notions of
what arguments are persuasive in their courts and have more influence within
their borders.
Perhaps the best known case of this is Apple Inc. and Samsung Electronics
Co.'s continuous litigation over gestures used in smartphone applications in
Germany, South Korea, and California. The South Korean company lost its case
in the United States and was forced to pay damages while suffering an injunction
on appeal, a ruling deemed rather "Apple-friendly." 124 Essentially the same case
was decided differently in South Korea, where the court awarded damages to both
parties, but netted Samsung the higher reward.125 The case was merely dismissed
in Germany.126
Pharmaceutical companies seeking the support and protection of their patent
http://www.fiercepharma.comlegal/new-gilead-patent-challenger-pops-up-as-delhi-
court-forces-a-rehearing ("In sending the appeal back to the patent office, [Justice]
Shakdher said the office appeared to rely too much on material supplied by the three
opponents.").
124 Christina Bonnington, What the Apple v. Samsung Verdict Means for the Rest of
Us, WIRED (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/08/what-apple-v-samsung-
means/.
125 Christina Bonnington, South Korean Court Rules Apple and Samsung Both Owe
One Another Damages, WIRED (Aug. 24, 2012), ht2://wwwwired.comV2012/08/s-
korea-court-rules- dmges!.
126 Jun Yang, Apple Loses German Court Ruling Against Samsung in Patent Suit,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.bloonberg.com/news/articles/2012-
09-21/apple-loses-german-court-ruling-against-samsung-in-patent-suit.
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rights would certainly benefit from native support.127 Additionally, such
cooperation is now required by some foreign governments,128 over disputes on
"standard essential patents,"12 9 though this is unlikely to greatly affect the
pharmaceutical industry.
Furthermore, cooperation between pharmaceutical companies and low-income
countries promotes good will, mitigating the growing negativity directed towards
pharmaceutical companies,130 and could promote business within the cooperating
127 Cf Ramnath Subbu. U.S. pharma companies benefit from large Indian generic
market, THE HINDU (INDIA) (Mar. 9, 2014),
http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industrv/us-pharma-companies-benefit-from-large-
indian-generic-market/article5764662.ece (addressing the United States' attempt to apply
sanctions towards India, and to demote India's status to "Foreign Country Watch List.").
128 See Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., CJEU Case C-170/13 (July 16, 2015)
(requiring, through a reading of the EU's competitions rules, that "standard essential
patent" owners who have licensed their patents on "fair, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms" take several steps to offer a license to infringers before seeking
injunction).
129 See Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission, Standard-
essential patents, 8 COMPETITION POL'Y BREF, 1-2 (June 2014) (defining a standard
essential patent as a "patent that protects technology essential to" "a requirement for a
specific item, material, component, system, or service." (citation omitted)).
130 Cf Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tavelt to $750, Overnight, THE
N.Y. TIMES (Sept 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.conI2015/09/21/business/a-huge-
overnight-increase-in-a-drus-price-raises-protestshtf? r=O (demonizing CEO's
decision to inflate drug prices on a 62 year old drug).
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nation.131 These benefits obviously support the interests of both the
pharmaceutical companies and countries.
Countries that weaken patent protections also risk attacks on their distribution
system. Compulsory licensing only allows the country to acquire a cheaper
version of the drug, but does not assist in distribution. Though production,
intellectual property rights, and distribution seem like wholly different matters,
they are not unrelated. A system which lacks strong intellectual property laws
only encourages counterfeiting. Theft and counterfeit drugs complicate
distribution for low-income countries, potentially and paradoxically increasing the
cost of compulsory licensed generics for those that most need them.132
Cooperation also potentially allows for experimentation not permitted within
the patent owner's native country.133 These experimentations could, for example,
131 See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 24 ("[A]ggressive use of compulsory licenses to
address emergencies, including even medical emergencies within the Doha Ministerial
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, may obscure other possible courses of action,
such as regulatory and cooperative measures, that might persuade foreign producers to
invest in local production facilities with greater long term prospects." (citations omitted).
132 Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of
Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71, 81 - 82
(2011).
133 Matthew Driskill, Indian drug makers take page from HIV playbookfor hep C
combo pill, FIERCEPHARMA (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.fiereepharmaaia.cost
(citing Ketaki Gokhale, Indian Drug makers Engineer Hep C
Cocktails Impossible in West, BloombergBusiness, Bloomberg (Oct. 9, 2015),
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include drug combination testing that may be restricted in the United States
through the stricter application of patent laws and protections.134 Obviously, the
opportunity to explore new innovations and discoveries should not be overlooked,
but it is within the patent owner's best interest to maintain some control over the
scope and scale of the research, which may not be possible under a more
traditional compulsory license.135
Indeed, ignoring all these benefits would be a mistake. Compare, for example,
Gilead's voluntary licensing in India to Hoffman-La Roche's ("Roche")
"voluntary" licensing in Brazil.
In 2001, Brazil announced its plan to compulsory license nelfinavir, from
Roche, after initial negotiations over pricing failed.136 The U.S. Trade
Representative at the time, Robert Zoellick, filed a claim with WTO, but
eventually withdrew his support after receiving considerable negative publicity. 137
Under the threat of a Brazil compulsory license and without any government




135 However, companies should be careful while drafting any contract to not generate
induced infringement through the license terms.
136 Brazil Intends to Break Patent on Roche's Nelfinavir to Produce Drug Locally,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 23, 2001), http://khn.org/morning-breakout/drOO006553/.
137 Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA 96 (J. Odell
2006).
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manufacturers.138 This "compelled" licensing agreement allowed Roche the same
right to draft the agreement as a voluntary license would, but only under threat of
compulsory licensing. Thus, Roche lacked the leverage necessary for fair
negotiations. Should the negotiations have failed, Brazil still held the right to
compulsory license the drug. This and other compelled licenses should only be
described as contracts made under coercion1 39 and are as unconscionable as the
compulsory license. Yet, they are just as enforceable under the letter of every law.
Roche had some power over the terms of the negotiation, but lacked any
native support, had little leverage in the negotiations, lost the support of the U.S.
government, lost control over their patent rights in Brazil, and invited future
attacks.
Meanwhile, Gilead recently negotiated a deal with eleven Indian generic
manufacturers. Though the India Patent Office initially deemed the drug "not
inventive enough" to warrant patent protection, the Indian court granted Gilead
another opportunity to defend its patent before the Patent Office.140 It would not
138 Example of Health-Related Compulsory Licenses, CPTECH (Oct. 28, 2015),
http://www~cptech.or-/i/health/cbrecent-exaMples.html ("[O]n August 31, they
reach[ed] an agreement; Roche will sell the drug in Brazil at an additional 40% discount,
and Brazil will not issue the compulsory license").
139 Coercion arises when a party consent to transaction is obtained through a "threat
to deprive [the party] of a legal right," like the right to property. See David V. Snyder,
The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: Public and Private Attempts to
Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WIs. L. REV. 607, 679 - 80 (1999).
140 See Michael Mezher, Follow the Rules, Indian Court Tells Patent Office in
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be unreasonable to believe this grant was made in light of growing local interests,
including those eleven companies which have exclusive licensing agreements
with Gilead.
D. The Joys of Revenue: Abbott's Mistake in Thailand
Perhaps the most obvious advantage, aside those already mentioned, for
companies that choose to voluntary license blockbuster drugs, is the ability to
protect existing revenue streams and the potential creation of additional revenue
sources.
If the incentive of drug patents is the ability to control the pricing of drugs,
compulsory licensing is a serious threat. 141 Compulsory licensing of drugs forces
lower drug prices, not only on the licensed generic, but on all related drug
prices.142
The apparent fact that directly competing generics reduce the price of a brand
name drug is too often taken at face-value.143 Indeed, there is some conflicting
evidence on what effect competing generics have on the price of brand name
Sovaldi Case, REGULATORY AFFAIRS PROFESSIONALS SOCIETY (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-F~ocus/News/20 15/02/04/21 240/lndia-Gilead-Patent/.
141 See Charitini Stavropoulou, Compulsory licensing and access to drugs, 16 EUR. J.
HEALTH ECON. 83 (2015).
142 Id.
143 Steven N. Wiggins & Robert Maness, Price Competition inPharmaceuticals: The
Case of Anti-Infectives, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 247, 247 (2004).
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drugs in well-established markets.144 There is some evidence that generics
actually increase the price of said brand name drugs.145 However, whether
generics introduced after a patent expires tend to increase or decrease the actual
price of the brand name drug is irrelevant. The actual affect, whether positive or
negative, is too insignificant to be important. 146 However, this only holds true for
an already well-established drug. 147
Professor Stavropoulou best illustrates this in her paper using mathematic
models.148 Though her paper was intended to present compulsory licensing as a
bargaining tool for development countries,149 it also perfectly illustrates the
dangers of compulsory licensing to drug prices.15 0 The paper illustrates and
144 Tracy L. Regan, Generic Entry Price Competition, and Market Segmentation i
the Prescription Drug Market, 26 INT'L J. OF INDUS. 930,(2008).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 931 ("each generic entrant is associated with an average 1% increase in the
branded price").
147 Though the introduction of new generic drugs into a market might not affect the
price of the brand-name drug, it would be incorrect to infer that brand-name drug
company do not see a substantial decrease in profits after the introduction of the generic.
See U.S. Cong. Budget Off., How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has
Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry 28 (1998).
148 Charitini Stavropoulou, Compulsory Licensing and Access to Drugs, 16 EUR. J.
HEALTH ECON. 83 (2015).
149 Id. at 83-84.
1so Prof. Stavropoulou makes some assumptions in her paper. For starters, she
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models three main propositions. When the cost of production is high, the threat of
compulsory licensing is low.15 1 When the cost of production is intermediate, the
threat a compulsory license is credible, but it can be more economic if the patent
owner maintains its rights and simply supplies the drug.152 If the cost is low, it can
also be more economic for the country to exercise its compulsory licensing
right. 153
Once the compulsory license right is enacted, there exists a new competitor.
Even when limited to specific markets, the availability of a cheaper generic
unregulated by the patent owner or mitigated by an established and trusted brand
name creates demand of a cheaper product in the remaining market. Exportation
policies should help slow the declining drug price, but demand for the cheaper
drugs will continue to increase and more licenses could be compelled. In this
scenario, even without the threat of licensing or exportation, the prices of the
generics would equalize towards the cheapest price, cutting heavily into potential
profits. While Professor Stavropoulou's paper may prove this mathematically, the
assumes the model's hypothetical governments do "not regulate any aspect of drug
production and consumption." Of course, this is untrue, but is simply a way to simplify
the model. She also assumes "cross-national drug price differentials" are influenced by
demand and through the "interference of national governments." This can be assumed to
be true for all intents and purposes. Id. at 86.
151 This must be true, as there would be little incentive to compulsory license a drug if
the offered price did not greatly differ from the price of production. Id. at 88.
152 Id.
153 Charitini Stavropoulou, Compulsory Licensing and Access to Drugs, 16 EUR. J.
HEALTH ECON. 83, 88 (2015).
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point is further supported through empirical observation
Using Gilead as a model again, the price of sovaldi, Gilead's hepatitis C drug
continues to decrease even in those protected markets. Even with the control on
pricing and third-party participants that Gilead tries to maintain, the demand for
cheaper drugs continues. 154 Indeed, even Gilead cannot prevent the decline in
pricing, but can only stem the tide. However, this slow pricing decline does not
seem to have hurt Gilead's business.15 5 Still, Gilead is afforded more control over
the tide through its licensing deals than would be available to the victim of a
compulsory license who would have no say in pricing or distribution. Rather, by
removing the main incentive for a government from compulsorily licensing
sovaldi, Gilead has protected its marketability in those markets which can afford
the price of innovation.
The large force of pharmaceutical marketing is rarely directed towards low-
income nations.156 The obvious truth is most countries that issue compulsory
154 Cf Eric Palmer, Gilead Strikes Sovaldi Price Deal in Germany as it Picks Up
Speed in EU, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 13, 2015),
http://www.fiercepharma.comlstory/gilead-strikes-sovaldi-price-deal-ermany-it-picks-
speed-eu/2015-02-13 (citing the price of a twelve week course of Sovladi at $85,000
(USD) in the U.S. and approximately $44,546 (USD) in Germany).
155 See Diane Alter, Gilead Stock Price Prediction Shows More Gains Ahead (NYSE:
GILD), MONEY MORNING (Nov. 3, 2015), http://moneynorning.com/2015/11/03/gilead-
stock-price-prediction-shows-more- gains-aead-nyse-ild ("Our Gilead stock price
prediction shows gains ahead").
156 See Cassedy, supra note 7 ("So now, is this going to have a big effect on our
business model? No, because we did not develop this product for the Indian market, let's
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licenses for non-emergency use cannot afford the pharmaceutical product at the
brand name prices. As a result, there is little threat of lost revenue due to lower
prices in these low-interest markets. However, even if a pharmaceutical company
is not too concerned about he inevitable increase of generic alternatives, the
company should not ignore the potential for additional revenue available through
voluntary licensing.
In perhaps the best counter-example and most aggressive strategy against
TRIPS compulsory licensing, Abbott withdrew two of its applications from
Thailand's Drug Office after the Royal Thai government issued a compulsory
license on Kaletra, one of Abbott's HIV treatment drugs.157 Eventually, and
perhaps obviously, Abbott would eventually resubmit these applications. Unlike
the previously explored strategies, Abbott's strategy was purely retributory.
Abbott risked potentially losing all the revenue it might have made in Thailand,
and, perhaps more importantly, Abbot's withdrawal from the Thai market opened
the door for more potential compulsory licenses. 158 After all, if a work
requirement is TRIPS compliant, by making the drugs unavailable, Abbott had
be honest. I mean, you know, we developed this product for Western patients who can
afford this product.").
157 Kristina M. Lybecker & Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory Licensing in Canada and
Thailand: Comparing Regimens to Ensure Legitimate Use of the WTO Rules, 37 J. LAW
MED. ETHICS 222, 228-233 (2009).
158 See, e.g., MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH AND THE NAT'L HEALTH SECURITY OFF.
OF THAI., Facts and Evidences on the 10 Burnings Issues Related to the Government Use
of Patents on Three Patented Essential Drugs in Thailand 8 - 10 (2007) (illustrating
Thailand's willingness to apply compulsory licensing towards drugs not available).
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essentially abandoned its patent rights in Thailand.
Compare this strategy against the voluntary licensing model. At its simplest
comparison, voluntary licensing creates additional sources of revenue, while
retaliation can only hurt revenue. Gilead does not have to worry about the costs of
production, negotiation, or shipping for the generic drugs, but more importantly,
Gilead makes money from its licensing deal. Abbott's strategy merely delayed the
sale of two additional drugs.
Allowing countries to produce the drug locally and then using existing
domestic shipping methods is a better way to produce and disperse the drug, thus
allowing a more complete distribution within a country. If the country also
participates, by stringently protecting patent rights, it would protect its citizens
from the plague of counterfeit or diluted drugs. But, what should be more
compelling for the company is how this licensing strategy might create additional
profits. Gilead, again, illustrates the best method.
Egypt has one of the highest rates of Hepatitis C infection in the world.159
Egypt would be an ideal market for Gilead's hepatitis drug. However, most of the
population of Egypt cannot afford the drug at Gilead's price. 160 More importantly,
159 Daniel Lavanchy, The Global Burden of Hepatitis C, 29 LIVER INT'L 74 - 76
(2009).
160 Compare GNI per capita, PPP, THE WORLD BANK,
http://data worldbankor/indicator/NY.GNPPCAP.PPCD (last visited Nov. 11, 2016)
(citing the gross national income of Egypt at $10,260 (USD) per year) with Eric Palmer,
Gilead Strikes Sovaldi Price Deal in Germany as it Picks Up Speed in EU,
FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 13 2015), http://www.fiercepharma.con/story/gilead-strikes-
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those that can afford such relatively high prices are not as susceptible to Hepatitis
C infection.161 Hepatitis C is typically shared through exposure to infected blood,
like through the sharing of needles.162 If one can afford the price of sovaldi, one
should certainly also be able to afford the simple preventative measure of a new
needle.
Consequentially, those that cannot afford the drug are the ones in the direst of
needs, and those that can afford the drug do not often require it. In India the
estimated amount of people infected with the Hepatitis C virus is approximately
11 million. 163 However, the majority of Indians are not so economically affluent
that they could afford sovaldi at Gilead's market price.164 With the growing price
(citing the price of a twelve
week course of Sovladi at $85,000 (USD) in the U.S. and approximately $44,546 (USD)
in Germany).
161 Kimberly A. Page-Shafer, et al., Hepatitis C Virus Infection in Young, Low-
Income Women: The Role of Sexually Transmitted Infection as a Potential Cofactor for
HCV Infection, 92 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH, 670, 670-671 (2002) (illustrating the
decreased risk of HCV infection with increased income); Amitabh B. Suthar & Anthony
D. Harries, A Public Health Approach to Hepatitis C Control in Low- and Middle-Income
Countries, 12 PLOS MED 1 (2015).
162 Daniel Lavanchy, The Global Burden of Hepatitis C, 29 LIVER INT'L 74, 75-76
(2009).
163 See Hepatitis in India: Burden, Strategies and Plans, 3 QUARTERLY NEWSL.
FROM THE NAT'L CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 1, 3 (2014) (number calculated from
percentage infected and population census at the time of publication).
164 See Sonalde B. Desai, et al, INDIAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SURVEY 12 (2010)
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of pharmaceuticals, such circumstances could become more prevalent, meaning
fewer and fewer people and countries will be able to afford the cost of similar
treatments.
Rather than risk almost no income in such low profit markets, it would be
better a strategy to invite what revenue may come. After all, a percentage of
something is better than the whole of nothing. Even if only half of the infected
population of India can afford the generic price, Gilead still stands to make $2.5
billion (USD) in India alone. 165 Of course, Gilead hopes for the distribution to
affect an even higher percentage of the world population, with a long term goal of
eradicating HCV. 166 Though the eradication of HCV would eventually hurt
sovaldi's profitability, world-wide integration should allow for Gilead to amass a
sizable profit without fear of eventual competition.
CONCLUSION
Voluntary licensing is currently the best strategy for any company worried
about compulsory licensing, and should be considered even for those patents not
(providing the average Indian household income at 47,804 Rs (- 7,300 USD), but the
median income as low as 27,857 Rs (-424 USD)).
165 See generally Eric Palmer, Gilead Science prices Sovaldi in India at a Tiny
Fraction of the U.S. Cost, FERCEPHARMA (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/gilead-sciences-prices-sovaldi-india-tinv-fraction-us-
cost/2014-08-07 (pricing the generic at $900 USD).
166 Mark Terry, Gilead Offers Free Drugs in Georgia in Hep C Eradication
Experiment, BIOSPACE (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.biospace.com/News/gilead-offers-
free-drugs-in-georgia-in-hep-c/37358 1.
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yet considered under controversy. The other strategies employed by
pharmaceutical companies - at best - barely stem the oncoming tide or - at worst
- compel countries to apply compulsory licenses for intellectually protected
drugs. These strategies increase animosity between countries and companies and
needlessly waste money, ultimately hurting both the company and the country.
Voluntary licensing pulls ahead of the well-debated issue of compulsory
licensing by ignoring the losing strategy employed by the majority of
pharmaceutical patent owners. The voluntary licensing strategy focuses on the
potential benefits of licensing. Voluntary licensing allows the patent owner to
better control the threat of divergence through contracting; benefits the
cooperating parties through potential gains in research, good-will, pricing, and
marketing; and partially protects the economic interests of the patent owner while
creating additional sources of revenue. In short, voluntary licensing grants the
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